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ABSTRACT
The paper describes the spectacular growth of rice exports from Viet Nam
during the period 1989 to 1997.  From a situation of food shortages, the country
is now the second largest rice exporter after Thailand.  Export projections
indicate that there is potential for further export growth in all but the most
pessimistic scenarios.  This potential is constrained, however, by the relatively
underdeveloped marketing system.  A few large state enterprises have access to
capital and export licenses, but private traders and millers are generally small
and medium enterprises with limited credit and no legal access to world markets. 
Recent policy changes to promote internal trade liberalization and competition
between central and provincial state enterprises are encouraging, but need to be
extended to allow private traders to export.
1. INTRODUCTION2
After decades of importing rice and following severe food shortages in
1987-88, Viet Nam exported 1.4 million tons of rice in 1989.  At the time, this was
considered a government intervention to dispose of public stocks and to
generate needed foreign exchange during a time when foreign assistance from
the Soviet Union was disappearing.  Few observers could have predicted that
Viet Nam would not only continue to export rice, but that exports would grow
steadily, surpassing 3 million tons in 1996. 
The most important factor behind this growth is the liberalization policies
implemented in the late 1980s.  Although the outlines of the doi moi (renovation)
policies were approved by the Politburo in 1986, the first concrete measure was
the partial dismantling of the system of collectivized agriculture in 1988, followed
over the next few years by reforms to liberalize international trade, promote
foreign investment, and decontrol prices and interest rates (Irwin, 1995;
Plummer, 1995).  
After an initial burst of inflation, the economy responded strongly to these
reforms.  Since 1991, annual real GDP growth has been 6-10 percent.  The
agricultural sector has also accelerated, growing 5.1 percent per year over
1988-1995 compared to just 2.8 percent per year over 1960-1987.  This is an
important achievement for a country with 80 percent of its population living in
rural areas.  Rice is the most important subsector in agriculture and has
benefitted from policies to stimulate exports.  Over 1989-1996, rice production
grew 4.8 percent per year and rice exports grew 11 percent per year, allowing
Viet Nam to become the third largest exporter in the world (Viet Nam, 1996).3
Viet Nam may soon challenge Thailand as the largest rice exporter in the
world, although this outcome is not inevitable.  There are serious constraints to
further expansion of the market share of Vietnamese rice exports, mainly related
to marketing.  Recent policy changes in March 1997 promoting internal trade
liberalization and competition between central and provincial state enterprises
have moved in the right direction, but further changes are needed to allow
private enterprises access to world markets. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the constraints to expanding rice
exports from Viet Nam and the role that private traders and millers could play in
this process.  The paper is organized into seven sections.  Section 2 describes
the pattern of growth of rice production and exports.  Section 3 looks at the
potential of rice exports from Viet Nam.  Section 4 analyzes the structure of the
rice marketing system and its performance.  Section 5 considers the policy,
institutional, and infrastructure constraints to increased rice exports.  Section 6
presents recent policy changes that address some of these constraints.  Section
7 gives the conclusions.
2.  PATTERNS OF GROWTH
The importance of rice in Viet Nam can hardly be exaggerated.  Rice
accounts for 64 percent of the planted area and is grown by 84 percent of the
rural households.  In terms of food consumption, rice contributes about three
quarters of the calories in a typical Vietnamese family's diet (Viet Nam, 1996 and
data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey).  4
The impressive growth of Vietnamese rice exports, from 1.4
million tons in 1989 to over 3 million tons in 1996, has been the
result of favorable domestic and world market conditions.  On the domestic side,
Resolution 10 in 1988 allowed farmers to own agricultural equipment and large
livestock, allocated cooperative land to farmers on long-term leases, and
allowed farmers to sell their surpluses on the free market.  In 1989, trade
liberalization and devaluation in 1989 greatly improved the incentives for
producing goods, including rice, for export.  And Resolution 5 of 1993
strengthened land tenure and further liberalized agricultural markets (Cuc,
1995).
On the international side, after stagnant growth in the 1980's, world rice
markets began to expand in the early 1990's.  In 1995, world rice trade
exceeded 20 million tons, compared to just 10-12 million tons during the mid-
1980s (USDA, 1996 and USDA, 1994).  
Rice export growth in Viet Nam has, however, been characterized by
considerable variability.  For example, exports in 1991 fell by 30 percent relative
to the previous year, as the government limited exports in response to serious
production losses caused by pests in the Mekong River Delta.  The supply
shock, estimated at over 480 thousand tons of paddy equivalent, was absorbed
by exports reduction in order to ensure food security.  In 1996, exports increased
by almost 50 percent relative to the previous year, as the government raised the
export quota in response to the bumper crop that year. 5
Rice Exports and Food Security
Export growth has been achieved without compromising food security.  In
fact, net availability of rice per person has increased 8 percent since 1989, from
142 kg per person in 1989 to 149 kilogram in 1996 (see table 1).  Rice calories
per capita have not only shown a positive trend, but have also exhibited greater
stability than either paddy production or exports.  Table 1 shows that the
coefficient of variation of rice calories per capita (0.05) was less than half that of
paddy production (0.12) and about one sixth that of rice exports (0.32).  Rice
exports have taken the burden of variability, apparently more for the purpose of
stabilizing domestic consumption than for reasons related to international
markets.
Quality of Rice Exports
The quality of exported rice has increased considerably since 1989.  In the
early 1990's, Viet Nam had a reputation for being an exporter of inexpensive
low-quality rice, but over time the quality of its rice exports has increased.  High-
quality rice (5 percent broken and less) has grown from less than 1 percent of
rice exports in 1989 to around 30 percent in recent years.  Over the same
period, lower-quality rice (35 and higher broken percentage) has declined from
88 percent to 9 percent of the total (see table 2).  The increase in rice6
quality was the result of improvements in processing in
response to growing foreign demand. 
Destination of Rice Exports Destination of Rice Exports
Rice export destinations vary substantially from year to
year, as indicated by the large coefficient of variation in table 3. 
On average, over the period 1991 to 1996, one third of exports
went to Asia.  The second and third most important
destinations were Africa (27 percent) and the Americas (24
percent).  Exports to the Middle East have shown the strongest
growth among all destinations, followed by Asia (see table 3).
The destination of rice exports also has important
consequences for the quality of rice exports.  Table 4 shows
that for the period 1994-96, Asia was not only the main buyer
of Viet Nam rice, but it was the main buyer of high-quality Viet
Nam rice, while the Americas bought mainly 20 percent broken,
and Africa imported mainly low quality rice (15-35 broken).
Domestic and International Prices Domestic and International Prices
An analysis of domestic and international prices reveals
three patterns.  First, international prices are much higher than
domestic prices.  Even when comparing the prices of 35 percent
broken rice, domestic prices are 22 to 62 percent lower than7
Thai prices (see table 5).  Second, the transmission of
international prices to domestic prices is weak.  Domestic prices
are less variable than international rice prices, the coefficients of
variation being 0.06 and 0.10, respectively (see table 5).  Third,
Viet Nam export prices have converged toward international
prices.  As the quality of rice exported from Viet Nam has
increased, so have average export prices for Vietnamese rice. 
Table 6 shows that average export prices have increased from
65 to 79 percent of Thai 5 percent broken during the period
1989 to 1996.  This is partly a reflection of the larger share of
high quality rice in Viet Nam's exports.  But even the prices of
the same quality rice have converged.  In 1994, 5 percent
broken export prices for Vietnamese rice were 85 percent of
corresponding Thai prices, but in 1995 and 1996, Vietnamese
prices were 88-89 percent of Thai prices for the same quality.  
3.  POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE EXPORTS
What is the potential for further expansion of rice exports in
Viet Nam?  Some analysts suggest that even a level of 2 million
tons export is not sustainable given the increasing domestic
demand for rice in Viet Nam and the land constraints on
intensive rice farming in the two deltas (see Valdecanas 1996
and Pingali et al., forthcoming).  Our analysis suggests a more8
optimistic conclusion regarding the effect of domestic demand
on rice exports.  In this section, we discuss the prospects for
domestic demand and production over the next 20 years.  
Domestic Demand for Rice Domestic Demand for Rice
The most important determinants of long-term trends in
domestic demand are population growth, income growth, and
urbanization.  All three of these factors are likely to contribute to
a slowing of the growth in domestic demand for rice.
Viet Nam's population is currently 75 million, with an
annual growth rate of 2.1 percent.  The growth rate, however,
is expected to fall sharply over the next decade as a result of
government policy and rapid economic growth.  According to
projections by the World Bank and the United Nations, the
population growth rate will fall to between 1.2 and 1.6 percent
for the period 2005-2010 and 1.2 percent for 2015-2020.  By
the year 2020, the population will reach 110 million according
to the World Bank and 104 million according to the "medium
variant" of the United Nations projections (Bos et al., 1994 and
United Nations, 1996).   
Urbanization tends to reduce per capita rice demand since
urban households tend to have more diversified diets,
consuming less rice than rural households.  Huang and David9
(1993) argue that urbanization is a major factor in the decline in
per capita rice consumption in Asia, although its impact in Viet
Nam has been modest.  Although per capita rice consumption is
lower in Vietnamese cities than in the rural areas (see Figure 1),
the increase in the share of the population living in urban areas
has been relatively slow.  The U.N. Economic Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) estimates that Viet Nam's urban
population is growing at 3.7 percent per year (ESCAP, 1997). 
At this rate, Viet Nam's urban population would rise from 20
percent of the total in 1995 to 33-35 percent by 2020.  Given
the rural-urban difference in per capita rice consumption (35-50
kg in the upper quintiles), this urbanization would reduce per
capita demand by 5 to 7 kg, or 3-4 percent of the current level. 
The impact of urbanization could be larger, however, if
economic growth and deregulation accelerate the pace of
migration to the cities. 
The effect of income on rice demand in Asia is the subject
of some debate.  Ito et al. (1989) examined 24 years of national
data from 14 Asian countries, concluding that rice was already
an inferior good in seven countries and that income elasticities
were positive but falling in five others.  Huang et al. (1991)
argued that methodological problems in that study led to
underestimation of the income elasticities, but they confirmed10
that the income elasticity of rice demand is negative in five
relatively high-income countries (Japan, Singapore, Taiwan,
Malaysia, and Thailand).  
According to the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS),
per capita rice consumption in Viet Nam rises with income at
low incomes, reaches a plateau, and then declines at higher
incomes (see figure 1).  In urban areas, the peak occurs at the
4  decile, implying a negative income elasticity at the mean
th
urban income.  Even among rural consumers, per capita rice
demand declines at higher incomes, though not until the 10
th
decile.  These relationships are important given that per capita
gross domestic product has grown at over 6 percent per year
over 1991-95 (Viet Nam, 1996).
Based on the trends in population growth, urbanization,
and income growth, we develop low, medium, and high
demand scenarios, shown in table 7.  The population
assumptions in the three scenarios are based on the low,
medium, and high variants of the United Nations projections. 
The urban population is assumed to remain at 20 percent of the
total in the low demand scenario, grow at 3.7 percent per year
in the medium, and grow at 4.0 percent per year in the high. 
The income assumptions also vary across scenarios: we
assume that per capita income grows at 6 percent in the low11
and medium demand scenarios and at 4 percent in the high
demand scenario.  
The income growth assumptions are combined with
household demand patterns in the VLSS to make projections of
per capita rice demand over the period 1995-2020.  The
relationship between rice demand and income is based on the
mean per capita consumption in urban and rural areas for each
of ten categories of per capita consumption expenditure in the
VLSS (the categories are defined by the expenditure deciles in
the sample).  The income of each household in the sample was
projected assuming 1) that income growth is constant across
households and 2) that households adopt the mean
consumption level for their expenditure category.  The results
are then aggregated using the projected size of the urban and
rural populations.
This method assumes that the cross-sectional patterns at
one point in time are a valid representation of changes in
demand over time as incomes rise and as household migrate to
the cities.  In addition, by using decile means, this approach
may overestimate per capita demand in the later years of the
forecast period.  This is because rural and urban demand is
implicitly assumed not to fall below the respective tenth decile
levels, no matter how high income rises.  Thus, the resulting12
forecasts of exports are conservative.   As shown in table 7,
per capita rice demand rises slightly and then falls as
households adopt more diversified diets.  In the medium
demand scenario, per capita demand begins to fall between
2000 and 2005, reaching 141 kg per capita in 2020.  In this
scenario, total rice demand is 14.7 million tons in 2020,
implying an average growth rate of 0.9 percent per year.  The
average annual growth rate of rice demand is 0.6 percent in the
low demand scenario and 1.5 percent in the high demand
scenario.  
Rice Production Potential Rice Production Potential
It is more difficult to evaluate the potential for further
expansion of rice production.  In the Red River Delta, the
potential for area expansion is very limited.  The Master Plan for
the Red River Delta calls for large investments in dykes,
irrigation infrastructure, and drainage, but the goal is to
rehabilitate and maintain existing irrigated areas rather than
expand the area under irrigation.  The National Institute for
Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP) is pessimistic
about area expansion, noting that each year 2000 hectares are
absorbed by urban and industrial development around Hanoi
and Haiphong.  The Institute argues that cropping intensity can13
and will increase, but that the additional sown area will be
devoted to vegetables and other crops as farmers diversify
production to meet the demand from urban consumers (NIAPP,
1995: 39).  Thus, in the Red River Delta, any increase in paddy
production will probably depend on improving yields rather than
area expansion or intensification.
In the Mekong River Delta, there is some scope for
expanding rice land, according to the sub-National Institute for
Agricultural Planning and Projection (sub-NIAPP).  The
conversion of fallow land into land for paddy production in the
provinces of Long An and Kien Giang would increase the sown
paddy area by 232 thousand hectares (sub-NIAPP, 1995).  In
addition, cropping intensity on existing rice land could be
increased, largely through investment in flood control and
drainage rather than irrigation per se.  These effects would
focus on the provinces of Minh Hai and Soc Trang on the
southern coast, where dry-season salinity is a problem.  The
combined effect would be to increase sown paddy area by 500
thousand hectares, representing 7 percent of national sown
area. 
The potential for yield increases is more difficult to
estimate.  Average paddy yields grew 3 percent annually over
1985-1995 and have reached 3.7 tons per hectare.  Even with14
no change in sown area, this rate of yield growth would allow
paddy production to increase faster than Viet Nam's population.  
Historical rates of yield growth, however, may not be
sustainable.  Among the developing countries in Asia, yields
grew just 1.2 percent annually over 1985-1995, suggesting that
part of Viet Nam's yield growth represents a one-time response
to decollectivization and market liberalization.  
Pingali et al. (forthcoming) argue that further increases in
Vietnamese yields may be difficult to achieve.  For example,
fertilizer use expanded rapidly over the 1980s in response to
market liberalization, but application rates in the two main
deltas are now similar to those in other irrigated regions of Asia. 
Furthermore, the high yields depend on labor-intensive
cultivation methods that farmers may not be willing to continue
as wage rates rise.  Although the industrialized and newly
industrialized countries obtain yields of 5.7 to 6.9 tons/ha, the
only developing countries in Asia with higher yields than Viet
Nam are China (6.1 tons/ha) and Indonesia (4.5 tons/ha).  These
two countries have much larger areas under irrigation: 93 and
72 percent, respectively, compared to around 56 percent in Viet
Nam (Pingali et al., 1997: 21). 
In summary, there is little scope for expanding sown paddy area
significantly so expansion in paddy production will increasingly depend on yield15
improvements.  Although yield growth has been relatively strong over the last ten
years, it seems likely that this part of a one-time response to liberalization and
improved incentives.  If this is true, yield growth in Viet Nam will probably decline
toward the yield growth rate of other developing countries in Asia.  
In table 8, these conclusions are incorporated in the assumptions behind
low, medium, and high rice supply scenarios.  The low supply scenario assumes
no increase in sown paddy area and just 1.2 percent yield growth over the
forecast period.  In other words, it is assumed that none of the projected growth
in rice area in the Mekong Delta materializes and that yield growth falls
immediately from 3 percent to the Asian average of 1.2 percent.  The medium
supply scenario assumes that sown paddy area grows 1 percent annually until
2000 and is constant thereafter, while yields grow at 2 percent per year until
2000 and 1.2 percent after that.  The high supply scenario assumes that sown
paddy area increases 1 percent per year until 2005 and is constant thereafter
and that yields grow 2 percent annually until 2005 and 1.2 percent for the
remainder of the period.
The result of these assumptions is that milled rice production rises from
14.1 million tons in 1995 to between 19 and 23 million tons in 2020.  This implies
an annual growth rate of 1.2 percent in the low supply scenario, 1.6 percent in
the medium, and 1.9 percent in the high.  
Rice Export Scenarios16
Combining the three demand scenarios from table 7 and the three supply
scenarios from table 8, we get nine projections of exportable rice surpluses,
shown in table 9.  In the most pessimistic scenario, low supply and high demand
combine to keep exports in the range of 2.0 to 2.2 million tons over the forecast
period.  At the other extreme, the high supply/low demand scenario shows
exports rising from 2.5 million tons in 1995 to over 9 million tons in 2020.  In the
medium supply/medium demand scenario, exports reach 6 million tons by 2020.  
The validity of this exercise obviously depends on the reliability of the
assumptions.  One important limitation is that these projections assume that
prices are constant.  Trends in world demand and the behavior of  competitors
such as Thailand, India, and the United States will determine how realistic this
assumption is.  The large increase in Vietnamese exports in some of these
scenarios could well depress world prices, dampening the export expansion. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from these projections that rice exports from Viet Nam
have the potential to expand significantly in all but the most pessimistic
scenarios.  
Even if the cautionary comments about sustainability of production growth
are justified, there is still scope for improvement in irrigation, adoption of modern
varieties, and improved management of plant nutrients and soil.  Furthermore,
we believe that there is a too ready acceptance of the hypothesis that demand
for rice in Viet Nam will grow at a rate higher that the population rate.  In fact, the
more important constraint on export growth may be related to the structure of the17
marketing system and other constraints related to policy, infrastructure, and lack
of investment in agricultural research.  The next section addresses these issues.
4.  4.  MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
A 1995-1996 survey of farmers, traders, millers, and state
owned enterprises by the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) found that, while the rice production system in
Viet Nam is almost entirely dominated by the private sector,
state owned enterprises still play a substantial role in rice
marketing.  State owned enterprises, including those of the
central government (VINAFOOD) and those of local
governments (provincial food companies), are the main
beneficiaries of the rice export quota policy and the associated
export licencing system.  The private sector plays an essential
role, however, in procuring rice from farmers, supplying rice to
exporters, and distributing rice within the country.  In the
complex web of links characterizing the rice marketing system
of Viet Nam, five main features can be identified.  First, the
private sector is key to the functioning not only of the
production system, but also of the marketing system.  Second,
in spite of its importance in the distribution system, the private
sector is largely underdeveloped and regionally unbalanced. 
Third, trade and market information are highly localized. 18
Fourth, credit constraints have serious implications for
procurement activities, storage, and investment.  And finally,
the marketing costs of the state owned enterprises are 
considerably higher than those of private traders.  Each is
discussed in turn.
Key Role of the Private Sector Key Role of the Private Sector
In 1995, each agricultural household in Viet Nam was producing enough
rice to feed almost 9 persons. Since the average agricultural household in
Vietnam has 5 members, there is a surplus available for marketing.  The extent
of commercialization of paddy farmers in Viet Nam can be measured by the
marketed surplus ratio, defined as the volume of sales as a proportion of
production.  The marketed surplus ratio in the two main producing regions of
Viet Nam is over 50 percent in all seasons (see table 10).  The marketed surplus
is greater in the Mekong River Delta (72 percent) than in the Red River Delta (62
percent).  Other regions are less commercialized.  The average marketed
surplus in the North Mountains and Midlands region, for example, is under 20
percent.  
Paddy marketing is dominated by private traders, who purchase about 96
percent of total marketed surplus from farmers (see table 11).  Millers and state
owned enterprises also buy from farmers, but their contribution is minor in every
region and season.19
In addition to buying most of the marketed surplus from farmers, private
traders are also the main suppliers of rice to state owned enterprises in the
Mekong River Delta.  The marketing systems in the north and south differ in the
ultimate destination of rice purchased by state owned enterprises.  In Red River
Delta, state owned enterprises supply domestic consumers, while in the Mekong
River Delta their rice sales are mainly in the form of exports (see IFPRI 1996,
chapter 4, section 5).
Underdevelopment and Regional Imbalance of Private Sector
Private-sector traders and millers in Viet Nam are, for the most part, small. 
In spite of the existence of some large traders and millers in the south, the
average throughput is still quite small when compared to that of the state owned
enterprises.  The latter have an average monthly rice sales of over 4,000 tons
compared to about 33 tons for traders and 171 tons for millers (see table 12). 
In the Mekong River Delta and North East South, the marketing system is
more developed than in the rest of the country.  Wholesalers in the Mekong
River Delta, for example, sell 91 tons of rice per month on average, while the
average is only 32 tons in the Red River Delta.  Medium-sized millers sell about
1.75 tons of rice per month in the Red River Delta and about 38 tons in the
Mekong River Delta. Moreover, there are more large millers and polishers in the
Mekong River Delta and North East South than in the Red River Delta.  Even
these large millers, however, are small relative to state owned enterprises.  In
the Mekong River Delta, for example, the polishers have average monthly sales20
of 800 tons, while the state owned enterprises in the same region have average
sales over 5,000 tons. 
A similar pattern is found in the total value of assets of different types of
marketing agents.  The assets of state owned enterprises average $1.6 million,
while those of private traders are worth $2900 on average and those of millers
$31 thousand.
Local Nature of Trade and Information
Even though Viet Nam has an aggregate rice surplus, many regions have
rice deficits.  The Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta have
surpluses of 0.42 and 4.74 million tons, respectively, but the
other five regions have rice deficits totaling 2.17 million tons. 
These regional deficits are met through inter-regional trade.
Domestic trade flows by private sector and shipments of rice by state
owned enterprises are the main mechanisms for distributing paddy within the
country.  State owned enterprises tend to dominate long-distance trade within
the country.  A small number of state owned enterprises are responsible for
about half of the 2.17 million tons of rice traded between regions in Viet Nam.  In
contrast, private traders are rarely involved in rice trade transactions at more
than 400 km distance. Over 90 percent of the paddy procurement and rice sales
take place within 100 km of the traders' residence. 
The local nature of marketing is also reflected in the limited information of
marketing agents regarding rice markets outside of their immediate21
surroundings.  Most agents indicate personal contacts as the main source of
information for prices and regulations affecting their business.  Even though half
of all wholesalers own a telephone, access to broader and more formal market
information is very limited.  By and large, private marketing agents ignore price
movements and distribution channels in regions other than their own. 
Credit Constraints
As in the case of the value of assets, there is a remarkable difference in
scale of credit available to the private sector and to state owned enterprises in
Viet Nam.  In the Mekong River Delta, for example, wholesalers and medium
millers report having debts of less than $5,000 on average, while large miller-
polishers report debts of $75,000.  State owned enterprises in the same region,
however, have average debts of about $5.8 million.  As shown in table 13, most
of the credit for traders comes from informal sources, such as friends and
relatives (37 percent) and moneylenders (17 percent).  For millers, two thirds of
all credit comes from banks.  
Credit constraints are common to all types of marketing agents, both
private and public.  The extent of these constraints is reportedly very high: 
credit requirements vary between three and ten times the actual credit available. 
The interest rate that private marketing agents were prepared to pay for access
to additional credit is close to the market rate, whereas the rate state owned
enterprises were willing to pay is below the market rate (see table 13, and IFPRI
1996, chapter 4, section 9).22
The credit constraints assessment by marketing agents is reflected in their
very short-term storage behavior.  Holding stock of rice for more than two weeks
is rare among private sector agents, and only large millers and polishers can
afford an average holding period of more than two weeks.  The average holding
period for traders is less than a week.  State owned enterprises can afford to
store rice for longer periods, with an average holding period of about four weeks
in the Mekong River Delta (see table 15).
The main components of grain storage costs are the
deterioration of the commodity and the foregone interest on the
revenues that could have been obtained by selling the
commodity at harvest.  If the private sector does not have easy
access to credit, private storage will be greatly diminished.
Marketing Costs And Profitability
Based on information collected by the IFPRI Survey, the
marketing costs of the state owned enterprises are considerably
higher than those of private traders.  Unit costs of state owned
enterprises in the Mekong River Delta and the Red River Delta range from 4 to
16 times the corresponding costs in the private sector (see table 16).  This
inefficiency of the public sector is a reflection of barriers to entry that prevent
private traders from competing with state owned enterprises in rice exports and
long-distance trade.  23
Data from the IFPRI Survey provide a decomposition of retail rice prices
into the unit costs and profits in production and marketing (see table 17).  These
results show that marketing costs are lower in the Red River Delta ($19 per ton)
than in the Mekong River Delta ($33 per ton).  Moreover, the gross margins
(including costs and profits) of marketing agents in the Red River Delta are lower
than in the Mekong River Delta both in absolute terms ($53 versus $88) and as a
percentage of retail price (17 percent versus 29 percent).  On the other hand,
the total unit costs of production and marketing are higher in the Red River Delta
than in the Mekong River Delta, being about 71 percent of retail price in the Red
River Delta and 51 percent of retail price in the Mekong River Delta.  Finally, unit
profits of marketing agents and farmers are higher in the Mekong River Delta
and this is particularly true for farmers.
The higher marketing costs in the Mekong River Delta are a reflection of a
more complex marketing system characterized by higher transportation, labor,
and depreciation costs.  This complexity, however, does not result in an
exploitation of farmers or consumers, as often is implied in policy discussions in
Viet Nam.  Farmers earn higher profits in the Mekong River Delta than in the
Red River Delta, both in absolute terms and as a share of retail price.  At the
same time, rice consumers are better off in the Mekong River Delta because the
retail price is lower than in the Red River Delta.  
5.  POLICY, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS24
Earlier we argued that Viet Nam has the potential to challenge Thailand as
the leading rice exporter.  This potential, however, is constrained by the
structure of the marketing system with its still largely underdeveloped private
sector and inefficient public sector.  If Viet Nam is to acquire and maintain world
rice leadership, several constraints to the development of the marketing system
will have to be alleviated.  This section examines the constraints originating from
restrictive policy, poor transportation system, and weak investment in research.
Restrictive Policy
Government policy has retarded the development of the rice marketing
system in three main ways.  First, the government has adopted a rice export
quota policy and allocated the quota exclusively to state owned enterprises,
effectively prohibiting the private sector from engaging in rice exports.  From
economic theory, we know that an export quota represents an implicit tax on
domestic producers.  In 1996, for example, this implicit tax was 21 percent,
equivalent to a rent of $166 million enjoyed by exporters (see table 18).  The
licencing system as implemented in Viet Nam reduces the incentives to improve
performance.  Prohibiting the private sector from getting exposure to
international markets may limit the ability of Viet Nam to exploit the opportunities
for increasing market share and to acquire the flexibility needed to operate in
world markets.
Second, until recently, the central and local government restricted the
trade from the south to the north of the country in a variety of ways including25
regulations against inter-provincial trade, police road blocks, and taxes.  The
most visible outcome was a persistent gap between rice prices in the north and
south that could not be explained by transportation costs alone.  In 1995, for
example, less than half of the north-south price differential could be explained by
transportation and marketing costs.  Almost 60 percent of the price differential
was the result of policy restrictions that effectively prohibited or discouraged
private trade.
Third, preferential access to credit given to state owned enterprises
discriminates against the private sector, limiting its capacity to expand
procurement activities and invest in storage and transportation to develop a
modern distribution system.  The removal of barriers to entry and exit would
increase competition and the efficiency of the marketing system.
Poor Transportation System
Shipping rice out of the country is a very expensive operation in Viet Nam.
This is due partly to the high fees associated with port operations and partly to
poor port infrastructure.  Most of the rice export shipments are made out of
Saigon Port.  Even though its relative importance has been declining, over 70
percent of rice exports still pass through this port. 
When a foreign ship loads rice at Saigon Port, it has to pay channel and
pilots dues for the 48 miles of the channel linking the port to the South China
Sea.  Tonnage dues, berth dues, port charges, and other fees in Viet Nam
contribute to shipment cost almost twice as high as in Thailand.  In addition to26
high port charges, the loading rates are still very low:  about 1,000-2000 tons per
day compared to over 3,000 tons per day in Bangkok.  Since most rice exports
are sold free-on-board (FOB), these costs are built into the FOB price of
Vietnamese rice exports, helping to explain the lower price Viet Nam receives for
a given quality of exported rice.  
Two infrastructure problems also affect rice shipment.  The first is the lack
of proper navigational aids to allow safe night passage in the channel from Ho
Chi Minh City to the South China Sea.  This limits the number of hours per day
that can be used to move the cargo in and out of the port, increasing the
demurrage costs, which are about $6,000 per day.  
The second infrastructure problem is the lack of adequate port facilities
other than Saigon for domestic shipments.  Can Tho port is located in the middle
of the Mekong River Delta and would therefore be the natural candidate for
taking some burden off the congested Saigon port.  Currently, however, the Can
Tho port can easily accommodate only small vessels of about 5,000 tons.  Even
though the rice throughput in Can Tho doubled between 1994 and 1995 to
126,000 mt, this represents only 3 percent of rice exports.
Under-investment in Research and Extension Under-investment in Research and Extension
In Viet Nam, there are about 7000 agricultural scientists
working in various research institutions and universities. 
According to one well-known agricultural researcher in Viet
Nam, "virtually every Vietnamese agricultural scientist does27
something with rice" (Xuan, 1995: 27).  Whether or not this rice
focus leads to a breakthrough is a matter of debate, but it is an
indication of the importance given to rice research.  The
reputation of provincial and district leaders often depends upon
the performance of rice production in their jurisdiction.  That has
created a receptiveness toward new high yielding rice varieties
and an incentive for rice scientists in Viet Nam to collaborate
with international agricultural research centers, such as the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).  
Despite the central role of rice in policy and agricultural
research, the government's financial support of agricultural
research has been weak.  About 60-70 percent of the research
budget is used for salaries and other operating expenses.  The
investment per researcher was about 3,000 US dollars in 1995,
only one tenth of that of other countries in the region.  As a
result, the availability of equipment for scientific research relies
mainly on foreign grants.   Institutions are forced to engage in
income generating activities with immediate returns.  On
occasion, this has meant the release of new varieties without
sufficient testing.  
  Rice research in Viet Nam has made some important
contributions in spite of its resource constraints.  Several areas
represent major challenges for rice research in Viet Nam.  With28
practically all arable land being farmed in the two major deltas,
understanding the sustainability of intensive farming systems
becomes critical to Viet Nam's food security and its position as a
major rice exporter.  The intensive cultivation of the two deltas
puts significant stress on the environment through soil erosion
and salinization.  Some observers predict that Viet Nam may
reach a yield plateau (Pingali et al., forthcoming).  An important
area for further research is the combination of cropping
patterns, pest management, and nutrients management that
will minimize adverse environmental impact.  
An equally difficult and related challenge is that of
continuously raising yields.  The experience with hybrids from
IRRI and China is promising, but widespread adoption will
depend on solving problems related to seed multiplication,
improved grain quality, and capacity building.
Third, in order to increase export earnings, Viet Nam could
develop a capacity to produce high-value rice varieties.  Early
experiments with Japonica rice have given promising results. 
Further study will also be needed to develop fragrant varieties
such as Jasmine that could be profitable to produce and market
internationally.
Finally, research efforts directed to improving postharvest
technology could reduce losses through better techniques of29
drying paddy during the wet season and milling technology
capable of processing different types of paddy.  
6.  6.  RECENT POLICY CHANGES RECENT POLICY CHANGES
There have been positive signals during the last year in Viet Nam that
suggest that the government is moving in the right direction.  With regard to
policy, new directives issued in March and May 1997 eliminate some restrictions
and establish the basis for a more competitive marketing system.  Decision
140/TTg of March 8, 1997 liberalized internal trade, stating that "licenses and
controls on domestic food transport are abolished, as are food taxes for
wholesale activities among different regions, in order to create a unified and free
flow of distribution of food dictated by the demand and supply in the market". 
Decision 141/TTg of March 8, 1997 and decision 312/TTg of May 10, 1997
increased the quota to 3.5 million tons for the period March-December 1997.  It
also decentralized the allocation of the export quotas, with one third of the quota
going to centrally-controlled state owned enterprises (VINAFOOD) and two
thirds going to provincial state enterprises.  Private traders are still not allowed
to export directly, but this is an important step towards reducing the implicit tax of
the quota and weakening the market power of VINAFOOD.
With regard to infrastructure, the government has approved several
investment projects that will improve the rice marketing system.  The approval of
a project to improve Can Tho port will increase annual handling capacity from
the current 180,000 tons to 600,000 tons by the year 2000.  Current plans call30
for the port to be able to handle between 1.5 and 2.0 million tons per year by the
year 2010 (Saigon Times, May 14, 1997).
With regard to research, both improvements in rice quality and rice yield
are currently being pursued.  Some recent success with Japonica rice has been
achieved on small plots in northern Viet Nam, close to Hanoi.  In 1996, a small
quantity of Japonica was exported at a price of US$800-1,000/ton, four times the
value of ordinary Vietnamese rice (Saigon Times Daily, April 23, 1997).  Similar
experiments with fragrant rice in the South are also pursued.  Hybrid rice was
cultivated on 100,000 hectares in 1996 with an average yield of 7 tons per
hectare.  Genetic research methods have also been applied to breeding and
some hybrid combinations (2 or 3 lines) are currently under field investigation.
7. 7. CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS
The remarkable success of Viet Nam agriculture and rice
exports in particular in the past eight years is undeniable.  A
country for many years beset with persistent food shortages
has converted itself into a major rice exporter, while
simultaneously increasing domestic per capita consumption. 
Some analysts have argued that Vietnamese rice export growth
is not sustainable because of the probable growth in domestic
demand for rice.  Our analysis indicates that Viet Nam's
exportable surplus can continue to grow, due to the slowing
population growth and to the likelihood that per capita demand31
will stabilize and slowly decline.  We argue that, even under
conservative assumptions, Viet Nam could rival Thailand as the
leading rice exporter within 10-20 years.  
This potential is constrained, however, by a still
underdeveloped marketing system, characterized by a large
number of small-but-efficient private marketing enterprises and
a small number of large-but-inefficient state owned enterprises. 
The access of these private traders and millers to credit and
information is limited.  Physical and institutional infrastructure
constrain the development of an effective and modern marketing
system.  Restrictive policies continue to prevent open
competition in the rice exports and, to a lesser degree, in
internal marketing.  Recent policy changes are encouraging, but need to be
extended to allow the private sector to participate in rice exports.  The
sustainability of Viet Nam's success as a rice exporter depends, to a large
degree, on the development of a competitive and adaptable marketing system.  3
2
Table 1. Rice Production, Exports, and Availability per Capita
Year Paddy Equivalent Rice Export  Population Gross Net Availability Rice Calories
Production Rice (000 mt) (000 persons) Availability of of Rice per per Capita
(000 mt) Production  Rice per Capita Capita
(000 mt) (kg) (kg)
1989 18996 10557 1372 64774 163 142 1360
1990 19225 10684 1452 66233 161 139 1337
1991 19622 10905 1016 67774 161 146 1399
1992 21590 11999 1960 69405 173 145 1387
1993 22837 12692 1649 71026 179 155 1491
1994 23528 13076 1986 72509 180 153 1467
1995 24963 13873 2020 74090 187 160 1534
1996 26317 14625 2953 75705 193 154 1478
Average 22135 12301 1801 70189 175 149 1432
C.V. 0.12 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
Growth 5.1% 5.1% 11.1% 2.3% 2.8% 1.8% 1.8%
Source: Computations based on data from the General Statistical Office.
Note: 1. Equivalent rice production is derived from paddy production using a milling conversion factor of 0.65
and a losses factor of 0.145.
2. Gross availability per capita is equivalent rice production divided by population.
3. Net availability per capita is equivalent rice production minus exports divided by population.3
3
Table 2. Share of Rice of Different Qualities
Quality 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Growth Mean C.V.
(percent)
5% or less 0.3 3.3 7.5 19.0 25.6 44.8 30.5 28.9 78.7 20.0 0.77
10 1.5 13.0 27.6 21.3 26.0 25.4 24.6 16.7 26.9 19.5 0.45
15% 3.0 5.9 4.9 11.0 13.2 4.1 12.0 6.4 10.6 7.6 0.52
20 2.3 2.0 5.6 4.3 8.2 9.2 10.7 6.1 23.0 6.1 0.52
25 4.9 20.2 25.9 13.3 11.1 7.4 18.1 33.4 11.2 16.8 0.57
35 82.8 46.5 21.5 25.4 12.3 6.8 3.6 5.2 -35.1 25.5 1.06
45 or more 5.2 9.0 7.0 5.4 3.4 1.9 0.5 3.3 -23.4 4.5 0.62
High: <=10 1.8 16.3 35.1 40.3 51.6 70.2 55.1 45.6 44.7 39.5 0.55
Low: >10 98.2 83.6 64.9 59.4 48.2 29.4 44.9 54.4 -11.0 60.4 0.36





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Average Regional Shares of Viet Nam Rice Exports of
Different Qualities in 1994-1996 (percent)
Region 5% 10% 15% 20% 35%
Broken Broken Broken Broken Broken
Asia 32.9 45.8 41.5 0.1 46.8
Middle 24.4 25.0 3.3 0.0 0.0
East
Africa 15.6 10.0 43.1 7.7 38.0
Europe 3.9 2.0 2.6 1.7 0.9
Americas 23.2 17.2 9.6 90.5 14.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Trade.36
Table 5. Margins of Vietnam Regional Prices below Thai 5%
Broken
Average Average Average Thai 5%






0.064 0.065 0.056 0.107
Percentage Margin
below Thai 5%
27.3 50.8 62.4 0
Source: Based on computations using Bangkok prices obtained
from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and Vietnam prices from the General Statistical
Office.37
Table 6. Export Prices as a Share of Bangkok Prices
Year Viet Nam Average Thai Viet Nam Viet Nam
Export Price Viet Nam 5% Export 5% Export Price
for 5% Export Broken as as
Broken Price (US$) Percentage Percentage of 
(US$) (US$) (3) of Thai 5% Thai 5%
(1) (2) (1)/(3) Broken
(2)/(3)
198 NA 194 300 NA 65
9
199 NA 170 271 NA 63
0
199 NA 226 293 NA 77
1
199 NA 207 268 NA 77
2
199 NA 203 236 NA 86
3
199 228 218 270 85 81
4
199 284 266 320 89 83
5
199 298 266 338 88 79
6
Source: Based on computations using Bangkok prices obtained
from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), Vietnam prices from the General Statistical






















































Year Low demand scenarios Medium demand scenarios High demand scenarios
Per Populati National Per Populati National Per Populati National
capita on demand capita on demand capita on demand
demand (millions (000 demand (millions (000 demand (millions (000
(kg/year)  ) tons) (kg/year)  ) tons) (kg/year)  ) tons)
1995 157 73.8 11594 157 73.8 11594 157 73.8 11572
2000 156 80.0 12512 157 80.5 12606 158 81.0 12766
2005 153 85.2 13010 153 86.8 13306 157 88.5 13921
2010 148 88.7 13083 149 92.3 13725 156 95.8 14935
2015 142 92.6 13186 144 98.0 14122 154 103.6 15923
2020 138 96.5 13365 141 104.2 14682 152 111.9 16964
Source:  The low scenario assumes 6 percent annual per capita income growth, 4 percent
growth in urban population, and the low variant of the United Nations (UN)
population projections.  The medium scenario assumes 6 percent annual per
capita income growth, 3.7 percent growth in urban population, and the medium
variant of the UN population projections.  The high scenario assumes 4 percent
annual per capita income growth, no change in the level of urbanization, and the
high variant of the UN population projections.  The per capita demand projections
are based on patterns of rice consumption in the Viet Nam Living Standards
Survey, the income growth assumptions, and the urbanization assumptions (see











































Year Low supply scenario  Medium supply scenario High supply scenario
Sown Paddy Milled Sown Paddy Milled Sown Paddy Milled
area  yield  rice area  yield  rice area  yield  rice
(000' (tons per producti (000' (tons per producti (000' (tons per producti
hectares hectares on  hectares hectares on  hectares hectares on 
) ) (000' ) ) (000' ) ) (000'
tons) tons) tons)
1995 6766 3.69 14089 6766 3.69 14089 6766 3.69 14089
2000 6766 3.92 14954 7111 4.07 16348 7111 4.07 16348
2005 6766 4.16 15874 7111 4.32 17353 7474 4.50 18971
2010 6766 4.41 16849 7111 4.59 18420 7474 4.77 20137
2015 6766 4.68 17885 7111 4.87 19552 7474 5.07 21374
2020 6766 4.97 18984 7111 5.17 20753 7474 5.38 22688
Source: The low scenario is based on a) no change in sown area and b) yield growth of
1.2 percent.
The medium scenario is based on a) 1 percent growth in sown area until 2000
and no growth thereafter and b) yield growth of 2 percent until 2000 and 1.2
percent thereafter.
The high scenario is based on a) 1 percent growth in sown area until 2005 and no
growth thereafter and b) yield growth of 2 percent until 2005 and 1.2 percent
thereafter.  
Milled rice production is calculated assuming 66 percent conversion from paddy
















































































Year Low supply Medium supply High supply
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
demand demand demand demand demand demand demand demand demand
1995 2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49  2.49 
2000 2.44  2.35  2.18  3.84  3.74  3.58  3.84  3.74  3.58 
2005 2.86  2.57  1.97  4.34  4.05  3.45  5.96  5.67  5.06 
2010 3.76  3.13  1.96  5.33  4.70  3.53  7.05  6.41  5.25 
2015 4.70  3.76  2.00  6.36  5.43  3.67  8.19  7.25  5.49 
2020 5.62  4.30  2.08  7.39  6.07  3.85  9.33  8.00  5.78 
Source: Demand and supply projections in Tables 7 and 8. 41
Table 10. Marketed Surplus in Different Regions by Season
Season North Red North South Centr Nort Mekon Viet
Mounta River Centr Centr al h-east g River Nam
in and Delta al al High- South  Delta 
Midland  Coast Coast lands
Winter- 16 65 35 34 44 72 77 70
Spring
Summe . . 32 41 47 49 64 60
r-
Autumn
Rainy 8 58 . . . 29 95 48
All Year 12 62 37 37 45 55 72 64
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.42
Table 11. Marketing Channels for Farmers (percentage of sales)
Season Millers Traders Others Total
Winter-Spring 1.2 96.9 1.9 100.0
Summer-Autumn 1.1 96.9 2 100.0
Rainy 8.2 90.7 1.1 100.0
All Year 1.6 96.5 1.9 100.0
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.43
Table 12. Rice Sales and Value of Assets by Type of Marketing
Agent
Category Rice Sales Assets
(tons/month) (000 US$)
Viet Nam Traders 33 3
Millers 171 31
SOE 4,017 1,594
Mekong Polisher 800 218
Delta 
SOE 5,054 1,395
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.44
Table 13. Sources of Credit for Traders and Millers (percent)
Traders Millers
Friends & relatives 37 19
Money lenders 17 5
Commercial banks 11 30
Agricultural bank 26 37
Other 9 9
Total 100 100
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.45
Table 14. Credit Constraints
Current Credit Interest Rate Required
(US$) (%) Credit (US$)
Wholesaler
RRD 2,102 2.57 6,556
NES 1,810 5.04 262,202
MRD 4,014 4.43 18,143
Medium
Miller
RRD 571 2.17 3,810
NES 2,133 2.50 14,206
MRD 4,873 2.56 25,360
State Owned Enterprise
RRD 141,231 1.27 89,524
NES 3,454,382 1.53 9,206,349
MRD 5,769,893 1.75 14,147,186
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.46
Table 15. Rice Storage
Marketing Capacity Rice Stock Holding Period
Agent (tons)  (tons) (days)
Retailer 5.6 1.7 5.8
Wholesaler 117.3 22.3 5.9
Assembler 6.1 0.2 1.3
Small Miller 17.9 1.9 2.3
Polisher 1930.9 480.3 15.6
SOE 21734.3 2978.5 23.2
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.47
Table 16. Unit Operating Costs (US$/ton)
Region Wholesale Medium Large State
rs Millers Millers Owned
and Enterpris
Polishers es
Red River Delta  7.85 3.26 8.24 55.26
Mekong River 11.67 6.29 7.29 44.99
Delta 
Source:  Based on IFPRI Survey 1995-96.48
Table 17. Composition of Retail Price
Red River Delta Mekong River Delta 
(US$/ton) (% of (US$/ton) (% of
retail retail
price) price)
Farmers Unit cost 206 65 120 40
Unit profit 57 18 93 31
Farmgate 263 83 213 71
price
Marketing Unit cost 19 6 33 11
Agents
Unit profit 34 11 55 18
Marketing 53 17 88 29
margin
Retail 316 100 301 100
Price

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 1: Rice Consumption by Expenditure 
Decile








Source: Data from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (1992-93)
Note: The deciles are defined on the basis of the real value of consumption 
expenditure per capita, including the imputed value of home production and the 
rental equivalent of housing and consumer durables.  All deciles are defined 
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